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Understanding how people perceive the pros and cons of risky behaviors such as terrorism or 
violent extremism represents a first step in developing research testing rational choice theory 
aiming to explain and predict peoples’ intentions to engage in, or support, these behaviors. 
Accordingly, the present study provides a qualitative, exploratory analysis of a sample of 57 
male youths’ perceptions of the benefits and drawbacks of: (a) accessing a violent extremist 
website, (b) joining a violent extremist group, and (c) leaving such a group. Youth perceived 
significantly more drawbacks than benefits of joining a violent extremist group (p = .001, d = 
.46) and accessing a violent extremist website (p = .001, d = .46). The perceived benefits of 
engagement referred to gaining knowledge/awareness, being part of a group/similar people, 
and fighting the enemy/for a cause. The drawbacks referred to being exposed to negative 
material and emotions, having violent/criminal beliefs and behaviors, and getting in trouble 
with the law. The perceived benefits of disengagement referred to no longer committing 
illegal acts, and regaining independence/not being manipulated. The drawbacks referred to 
exposing oneself to harm and reprisal. These findings provide an insight into how male youth 
think about (dis)engagement in violent extremism, and can inform future quantitative 
research designed to explain and predict (dis)engagement in violent extremism. Eventually, 
such research may inform the development of evidence-based prevention and intervention 
strategies.  
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Male Youth Perceptions of Violent Extremism: Towards a Test of Rational Choice 
Theory 
 
By contrast to the wealth of theoretical literature on terrorism and violent extremism 
(e.g., Helmus, York, & Chalk, 2013), there is a dearth of primary research on this topic. As 
Victoroff (2005) explains, conducting research in this domain can be resource-intensive (e.g., 
involving fieldwork), potentially dangerous, ethically problematic, and may involve language 
barriers. In addition, officials may act as gatekeepers for gaining access to incarcerated 
samples, while active or inactive offenders may have little motivation to be involved in 
academic research. Thus, policy-makers have had to design and implement counter-terrorism 
strategies lacking in a sufficient and relevant evidence-base (Dhami, 2014). It is no surprise 
that consecutive governments, internationally, have found it difficult to effectively prevent 
violent extremism and intervene as necessary (Lum, Kennedy, & Shirley, 2006). The terrorist 
threat remains real and high.  
 
In the present paper we suggest that understanding how people perceive the pros and 
cons of violent extremism represents a first step in developing theoretically-guided research 
that aims to explain and predict peoples’ intentions and decisions to support and (dis)engage 
in violent extremism. The research reported in the present paper takes this first step by 
providing a qualitative, exploratory analysis of male youth’s perceptions of the benefits and 
drawbacks of specific behaviors associated with violent extremism. Before describing our 
approach, we briefly outline the theoretical perspective that our exploratory work can 
contribute to, and review relevant past research. We also discuss the methodological 
challenges that we (and other researchers) have faced.  
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Towards a Rational Choice Perspective on Violent Extremism 
An array of psycho-social theories have been proposed to explain violent extremism, 
including psychopathology (Cooper, 1978), paranoia (Post, 1998), frustration-aggression 
(Davies, 1973), and strain (Agnew, 2010).
1
 However, as Victoroff (2005, p. 33) concludes, 
“virtually none of them has been tested in a systematic way.” This is partly because they are 
not always amenable to testing due to a lack of precision or specification. In addition, not all 
theories have clear implications for counter-terrorism policy. The present study was not 
designed to test a specific theory. Rather, it was designed to provide exploratory data that 
might lead to future tests of a rational choice approach to violent extremism.  
 
Rational choice theories employed in psychological and criminological research draw 
in an approximate manner on the expected utility model in Economics (e.g., Gruber, 2001); 
extending its focus on subjective expected utility. According to this theory, a rational 
decision-maker (in this case a violent extremist) would decide whether or not to engage in 
violent extremism by assessing the subjective importance of the possible benefits and 
drawbacks of engaging in the behavior, in addition to assessing the subjective probabilities of 
these possible outcomes. The expected utility of the behavior would be determined by the 
probability-weighted difference between the benefits and drawbacks. The more that the 





Thus, rational choice theory can help researchers to understand the cognitive process 
by which an individual makes the above risk assessments and then acts on them. In fact, 
researchers can test more or less ‘rational’ models (e.g., Dhami & Mandel, 2012a, 2012b) and 
examine the moderating or mediating effects of non-cognitive factors, such as emotions, on 
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the cognitive process. Importantly, both the variables that an individual might consider when 
thinking about (dis)engaging in violent extremism, and those hypothesized by a researcher as 
important/relevant, can offer some insights into non-cognitive and even non-psychological 
components of violent extremism (e.g., social, political or economic factors). In addition, 
rational choice theory has the attraction of potentially providing clear policy interventions, 
by, for instance, increasing the costs and reducing the rewards so as to de-motivate offenders 
(Cornish & Clarke, 1986). 
 
The potential applicability of rational choice theory to violent extremism has been 
previously noted (Clarke & Newman, 2009). It is clear that violent extremism involves 
potential positive and negative outcomes (for the individuals involved), whose probability of 
occurrence is less than certain. Although there has been little research directly asking violent 
extremists or those ‘at risk’ of such behavior about what they perceive to be the pros and cons 
of (dis)engagement in violent extremism, there is some indirect evidence. This comes from 
research on involvement, engagement or radicalization processes, as well as on 
disengagement, desistance or deradicalization processes. Much of the research is based on 
secondary sources such as published (media) reports and criminal justice records of 
individuals, although some has come from interviews with incarcerated individuals. 
 
The small body of evidence suggests that although violent extremism may also 
involve significant self-sacrifice from losing connection with family, through experiencing 
formal sanctions, to death, there are also potential benefits to the individual. For instance, 
individuals may join terrorist groups because of a need to gain or retain affiliations or social 
ties (Hegghammer, 2006), or a need for identity and belonging (Borum, 2011). They may 
also join in order to readdress perceived injustices or grievances that are either personal to 
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them or directed at a more general level (Borum, 2011; Hegghammer, 2006); to fight for a 
specific cause (Hegghammer, 2006); or for some political or religious motive (Hegghammer, 
2006). Individuals may remain engaged in a group due to increased taking on of the group’s 
beliefs and values, and for group solidarity (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).  
 
Finally, individuals may disengage because they no longer agree with the group’s 
ideology or they are dissatisfied with the group’s organization. They may also disengage 
because their personal life circumstances lead them to alter their preferences and priorities 
(Garfinkel, 2007), or because they are physically separated from the negative peer influences 
and are faced with more positive influences (Garfinkel, 2007). Individuals may disengage 
because they become disillusioned because their initial motivations are not realized (Bjorgo, 
2011). 
 
In order to conduct tests of rational choice theory that involve asking individuals to 
assess the subjective importance of potential positive and negative outcomes of violent 
extremism and their probabilities of occurrence, it is first necessary to identify what the 
positive and negative outcomes would be. Here, less precise tests might involve simply 
asking individuals to think of the positive and negatives that come to mind and then assess 
those (e.g., Dhami & Mandel, 2012b; Hampson, Severson, Burns, Slovic, & Fisher, 2001). 
However, in such a study, researchers cannot control for the factors that different individuals 
might assess, and so cannot easily draw conclusions about the predictive utility of any 
specific factor, which consequently can make it difficult to draw policy implications. 
 
Alternatively, researchers could simply present individuals with an a priori 
(researcher-drawn) list of positive and negative outcomes (e.g., Beyth-Marom, Austin, 
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Fishhoff, Palmgren, & Jacobs-Quadrel, 1993). However, this may overlook outcomes that are 
noticeable to participants or it may prompt participants to respond to outcomes that would not 
otherwise have been apparent to them. It is thus recommended that researchers elicit 
participants’ perceptions of the outcomes of risky behaviors in order to better understand 
those mentally available factors that may motivate risk taking in naturalistic settings (e.g., 
Beyth-Marom et al., 1993; Dhami & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). Therefore, the main aim of the 
present study was to identify what individuals themselves perceive to be the benefits and 
drawbacks of (dis)engaging in violent extremism. These findings can then be used in future 
research to test rational choice theory.  
 
The Present Study 
The present study explored male youths’ perceptions of the number and nature of the 
benefits and drawbacks of (a) accessing a violent extremist website, (b) joining a violent 




Our focus on male youth was informed by research indicating that males are more 
likely to engage in violent extremism than females, and that those engaged in violent 
extremism are more likely to be younger than older (Bakker, 2006; see also Monahan, 2012). 
In addition, we sampled these youth from universities because the ‘homegrown’ nature of 
violent extremism has become a particular concern, and evidence suggests that violent 
extremists may be better educated on average than the population from which they came 
(Merari, 2010). In fact, the UK Government views universities as a potential ‘hotbed’ for 
radicalization (Glees & Pope, 2005; Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Ruben, 2008; HM Government, 
2011). 
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Our focus on (a) accessing a violent extremist website, (b) joining a violent extremist 
group, and (c) leaving such a group, was guided by the importance of studying different 
stages of criminal (dis)engagement in order to more precisely test rational choice theory and 
make more meaningful contributions to policy interventions (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). 
Indeed, Horgan (2008) notes that there are different stages of engagement in violent 
extremism, ranging from initial involvement, through committing a violent extremist act, to 
desistance. The level and/or nature of engagement at each stage can vary. Initial involvement 
may be as simple as accessing a website or joining an online forum (and this can contribute to 
the radicalization process). Committing a violent extremist act can range from supporting 
violent extremism in various ways (e.g., joining an extremist group, providing finances, 
intelligence, shelter, weapons, recruitment, and training) to committing a violent attack. 
Desistance can range from reducing engagement with a violent extremist network through to 
leaving the network altogether, and no longer holding violent extremist views. We have 
included exemplary behaviors at each stage of engagement mentioned by Horgan (2008). In 
addition, our selected behaviors and stages are considered by policy-makers to be important 




Fifty-seven male youth were recruited from universities within the UK via university 
student web-pages (e.g., university social networking pages) and by directly appealing to 
students on University grounds. All but three of the sample provided some demographic 
information. Of those who did, the average age was 22 years (SD = 2.9). Seventy-one percent 
described themselves as White-British, and 90.4% said they were British citizens. While 
63.5% of the sample said the highest level of education they had achieved to-date was 
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university, half of the sample were still in university education. Forty-two percent said they 
were in some form of employment. Twenty-nine percent said they supported the Labour 
Party and 25.5% supported the Scottish National Party. Finally, only 35.3 % said they did not 
hold any specific religious belief.  
 
Materials 
Participants were instructed to “Close your eyes and vividly imagine that you have 
[accessed a violent extremist website/joined a violent extremist group/left a violent extremist 
group]. On each line below, list the potential [benefits/drawbacks] of [accessing a violent 
extremist website/joining a violent extremist group/leaving a violent extremist group].” 
Participants were allowed to list up to seven benefits/drawbacks for each behavior. The 
decision to limit responses to seven was based on previous research showing that the average 
number of benefits and drawbacks is between four and seven (i.e., Beyth-Marom et al., 1993; 
Dhami & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). Only four participants reached the maximum number. 
Participants were not explicitly instructed to think of any specific violent extremist group. 
This was primarily because we wanted to avoid social desirability response bias, and avoid 
limiting responses to a narrow definition of extremism i.e., one specific group. 
 
A demographics questionnaire was used to collect data on participant age, ethnicity, 




The survey was self-administered online. The politically-charged and serious criminal 
nature of violent extremism can threaten the reliability of responses obtained on the topic, 
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especially from those who have engaged in it or who are being asked about their intentions to 
engage in it. Past researchers have suggested that collecting data online and anonymously 
increases the sense of ‘distance’ between the participants and researchers, and so can reduce 




A link to the study was advertised around university campuses using posters and on 
university or student-specific web-pages (e.g., Facebook groups). Participants were also 
approached on campuses by the researchers and provided with a paper copy of the link to 
type into a browser if they wanted to participate. Upon accessing the study website, 
participants were provided with an introduction to the study, and were asked to complete a 
consent form. Participants then responded to the qualitative part of the study asking about 
their perceptions of the potential benefits and drawbacks of accessing a violent extremist 
website, joining a violent extremist group, and leaving a violent extremist group. Each 
question was presented on a new page to enhance clarity and to create a ‘mental break’ 
between the questions. The order of the items asking about costs and benefits for each 
behavior (i.e., accessing, joining, and leaving) were counter-balanced across participants. 
Participants then completed the demographics questionnaire. Finally, participants were 
presented with debriefing information. The study was completed when the participant closed 
their internet browser. There was no opportunity for participants to return to previously 
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Below, we present a quantitative analysis of the number of perceived benefits and 
drawbacks that participants provided for each of the three behaviors, followed by a 
qualitative analysis of the nature of these benefits and drawbacks. 
 
Number of Perceived Benefits and Drawbacks 
Table 1 presents the average number of benefits and drawbacks that participants 
provided for each of the three violent extremist behaviors. Paired samples t-tests revealed that 
participants perceived on average significantly more drawbacks than benefits of accessing a 
violent extremist website (t[52] = 3.52, p = .001, d = .46), and joining a violent extremist 
group (t[48] = 4.71, p < .001, d = .62; see Table 1). By contrast, there was no significant 
difference in the average number of perceived benefits and drawbacks of leaving a violent 
extremist group (t[54] = .98, p = .332, d = .13; see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Nature of Perceived Benefits and Drawbacks 
The first qualitative responses were thematically analyzed. The first author read 
through all of the responses and created meaningful categories that were apparent for the 
benefits and drawbacks of each of the three violent extremist behaviors. Categories with less 
than 3% of responses across any of the three behaviors were coded as ‘other.’ Both authors 
then independently coded participants’ responses into these categories. Initial inter-coder 
agreement was high (i.e., from 87% to 98%). The few disagreements were discussed and 
agreed upon. Following this, an external coder was consulted who had no involvement in the 
study. Agreement between the authors’ agreed codes and the external coder was high (i.e., 
from 85% to 100%). The few disagreements were discussed and agreed upon.  




Excluding the ‘other’ categories, a total of 17 different categories of benefits emerged. 
Ten of these applied to accessing a violent extremist website, 11 to joining a violent extremist 
group, and nine to leaving a violent extremist group (see Table 2). A total of 13 different 
categories of drawbacks emerged, with 10 for accessing, and 11 each for joining and leaving 
(see Table 3). Tables 2 and 3 present the proportion of responses that fell into each category 
of benefit and drawback, respectively, for the three violent extremist behaviors. The findings 
are summarized below by the three stages of (dis)engagement.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
Initial involvement.  The most common perceived benefit of accessing a violent 
extremist website, representing 55.9% of responses, was that it would enable participants to 
‘gain knowledge, awareness, insight or understanding’ of the topic. With regard to the 
perceived potential drawbacks of accessing a violent extremist website, the two most 
common categories, representing 20.1% and 21.3% of responses respectively, were being 
‘exposed to negative material’ and ‘experiencing negative emotions.’  
 
Engagement.  ‘Being part of a group or with similar people’ was the most common 
perceived benefit of joining a violent extremist group, representing 32.0% of responses. The 
second most common benefit was that this enabled one to ‘fight the enemy, fight for a cause, 
take action, or make a difference or impact’, which represented 16.5% of responses. The two 
most common perceived drawbacks of joining a violent extremist group were that it 
‘encourages violence, criminal beliefs or behaviors’ and that participants might ‘get in 
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trouble with the criminal justice system’, representing 19.4% and 16.1% of responses, 
respectively.  
 
Disengagement.  Finally, the two most common perceived benefits of leaving a 
violent extremist group referred to ‘no longer being a terrorist or criminal, or no longer 
committing illegal acts’ and ‘regaining autonomy or independence, or no longer being 
manipulated or pressured’, which represented 20.7% and 20.7% of responses, respectively. 
The two most common perceived drawbacks of leaving a violent extremist group referred to 
‘experiencing reprisal or retaliation and being disliked’ and ‘exposing oneself to danger or 
harm’, representing 24.2% and 16.7% of responses, respectively.  
 
Discussion 
The fact that violent extremism is currently considered to be one of the greatest 
threats to national and international security means that it deserves research attention. 
However, there is a surprising lack of primary data on violent extremism, and that which 
exists has often been criticized on methodological grounds (Dhami, 2014; Victoroff, 2005). 
This has severely limited the ability of policy-makers to develop and implement effective 
prevention and intervention strategies (Lum et al., 2006).   
 
The present study represents a first step in designing systematic scientific research 
that can be used to test the utility of rational choice theory in describing and explaining 
violent extremism. According to some criminologists, this has potential value for reducing 
terrorism (Clarke & Newman, 2009). Precise tests of the theory first require specification of 
the pros and cons that individuals perceive may potentially arise from this risky behavior. 
Thus, in the present study we provide a glimpse of how male youth perceive the benefits and 
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drawbacks of accessing a violent extremist website, joining a violent extremist group, and 
leaving such a group. Our study explores the stages and levels of engagement that have been 
of interest to policy-makers (e.g., HM Government, 2011).  
 
Compatible with studies of youth risk perceptions and risk taking in the crime and 
other domains (Beyth-Marom et al., 1993; Dhami & Garcia-Retamero, 2012), participants in 
the present study thought of more drawbacks than benefits of accessing a violent extremist 
website and joining a violent extremist group. Although these perceptions do not necessarily 
have a deterrent impact (as demonstrated in past research where participants nevertheless had 
high levels of past and intended risk taking), it does indicate that male youth are aware of the 
negative consequences of engagement in violent extremism. Follow-up research is needed to 
establish whether this provides evidence of the effectiveness of current Government 
awareness raising campaigns or whether this suggests that such campaigns are unnecessary 
because youth perceptions may have been informed by other sources (e.g., parents, media).  
 
Overall, we found that the nature of the perceived benefits was more varied than were 
the drawbacks. Across the three risky behaviors, there were 16 meaningful categories of 
perceived benefits compared to 13 categories of perceived drawbacks. This suggests that 
prevention and intervention strategies based on deterrence via increasing costs may have to 
be more restricted in their scope than those based on reducing rewards.  
 
The most commonly perceived benefit of accessing a violent extremist website was 
that it would help participants ‘gain knowledge/awareness/insight/understanding’ of the 
violent extremist group and their motivations. Indeed, access to, and use of, extremist 
websites may act as one factor contributing to initial involvement in violent extremism 
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(Hegghammer, 2006; Helmus et al., 2013). These websites present ideological arguments that 
culminate in support for violence (Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003), and individual’s 
espousing such beliefs are considered to be at greater risk of engaging in violent extremism 
(Monahan, 2012; Pressman, 2009). For those individuals who are not already socially 
connected, exposure to new ideas such as these is a potential factor putting them at risk of 
radicalization (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). 
 
In terms of perceived drawbacks of accessing a violent extremist website, participants 
noted that they could ‘be exposed to negative material’ and ‘experience negative emotions’ 
such as annoyance, anger, worry, upset, fear and disgust. The idea that negative emotions 
may act as a deterrent runs contrary to the current view that these emotions are potential 
motivational ‘risk’ factors (Horgan, 2008; Monahan, 2012). Future research ought to tease 
apart the causal relation between negative emotions and (dis)engagement in violent 
extremism. 
 
The most commonly perceived benefits of joining a violent extremist group were that 
the individual would ‘become part of a group/be amongst similar people,’ and that he could 
‘fight the enemy/for a cause/take action/make a difference/impact’. Personal affiliations have 
been found to be associated with joining a violent extremist group (Hegghammer, 2006). In 
addition, Pressman (2009) notes that contextual factors such as contact with violent 
extremists and a community that is supportive of political or ideologically motivated violence 
may encourage engagement in violent extremist activities (see also Ginges, Atran, Sachdeva, 
& Medin, 2011; Horgan, 2008; Monahan, 2012). Similarly, the belief that one must right a 
wrong or has a grievance has also been identified as a factor potentially increasing the 
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likelihood that an individual may engage in violent extremism (McCauley & Moskalenko, 
2011; Monahan, 2012; Pressman, 2009). 
 
The most commonly cited drawbacks of joining a violent extremist group were that it 
‘encourages violent/criminal beliefs/behavior’ and that individuals would ‘get in trouble with 
the criminal justice system’ (i.e., be arrested, convicted, sentenced). The latter supports 
research showing that youth may perceive negative social reactions involving official 
sanctions as drawbacks of committing crime (e.g., Beyth-Marom et al., 1993; Dhami & 
Mandel, 2012a), and that violent extremists also may disengage because they believe the 
drawbacks of formal sanctions no longer outweigh the benefits of engagement in violence. 
 
In sum, the present study has provided preliminary data from which a rational choice 
model may be constructed and tested. It does not directly examine choice or the relations 
between risk perceptions and risk taking or choice. Future research can build on our findings 
by asking individuals to state how much importance (value) they attach to the specific 
benefits and drawbacks that we have identified, and to state what their subjective likelihood 
is of occurring. This data can then be used to test the validity of a rational choice model (i.e., 
weighting and integration of the pros and cons) in predicting variables such as support for, 
and attitudes towards, violent extremism, as well as intentions to (dis)engage in violent 
extremism. Studies using known violent extremists could also aim to predict their past level 
of engagement. 
 
If future research demonstrates that perceived benefits and drawbacks are predictive 
of accessing a violent extremist website and joining a violent extremist group, our findings 
suggest that prevention and intervention strategies could be two-pronged: reducing the 
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perceived sense of reward or providing specific rewards (e.g., need for belonging and group 
affiliation) in legal ways, as well as demonstrating the swiftness, severity and certainty of 
formal punishment. Furthermore, these strategies ought to be behavior-specific (e.g., 
accessing a violent extremist website v. joining a violent extremist group). 
 
With regard to leaving a violent extremist group, there was no significant difference 
in the number of the perceived benefits and drawbacks. We found that the most commonly 
cited benefits of leaving a violent extremist group were that individuals would ‘no longer be a 
terrorist/criminal or commit illegal acts’ and they could ‘gain autonomy/independence and 
not be manipulated/pressured’. Indeed, individuals in extremist groups can experience 
immense peer pressure (Hegghammer, 2006).  
 
The most commonly perceived drawbacks of leaving a violent extremist group were 
that individuals might ‘experience reprisal/retaliation/dislike’ from the group and they might 
‘expose themselves to danger/harm.’ The threat from within the group is not unrealistic as 
there are many documented examples of in-fighting and competition in such groups 
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). 
 
Disengagement from violent extremism may occur due to a change in function within 
the violent extremist group; a sense of de-radicalization where the individual socially and 
psychologically reduces his/her commitment to the group; a loss of social ties within the 
group; and disillusionment between the fantasy and reality of engagement (Bjorgo, 2011; 
Garfinkel, 2011; Horgan, 2008). Our findings suggest that although individuals see benefits 
to disengagement, they also see the potential for violence being directed at them. This 
underscores the need for preventive action, since individuals who join a violent extremist 
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group may find it difficult to leave for these reasons. Again, if future research demonstrates 
that the above perceived benefits and drawbacks of leaving a violent extremist group 
predictive (dis)engagement in violent extremism, intervention strategies could be designed to 
help individuals perceive greater benefits of leaving, and they can aid disengagement via 
providing safety and security (Garfinkel, 2007).  
 
Potential Limitations and Further Directions for Future Research 
Some critics may argue that our sample of male youth was unrepresentative of violent 
extremists because they were predominately non-Muslim, white and British. We did not 
specifically target non-British, Muslim minorities because to do so would be viewed as 
invoking racial stereotyping. Such stereotypes run contrary to the official police statistics 
which show that, in 2010, individuals of white origin were approximately four times more 
likely to be stopped and searched under the Terrorism Act 2000 than those of an Asian or 
Asian British origin (Home Office, 2012). A report by the Security Service confirms that 
violent extremists in the UK cannot be profiled in terms of race, nationality or religion, and 
that it is important to adopt a broad analysis in this domain. Most British Muslims are not 
extremists and that they do not support extremism. In addition, the fact that participants in the 
present study were not explicitly instructed to think of any specific violent extremist group 
also meant that responses were applicable to a wider range of participants (including British, 
non-Muslims). We therefore believe it is important for research on violent extremism 
(particularly when it is of an exploratory nature) not to confound the concept with other 
variables such as race, religion and nationality (e.g., HM Government, 2011), and to adopt a 
broad definition of extremism.  
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Nevertheless, in hindsight it may have been useful to have asked our participants 
which violent extremist groups they had in mind. This would have enabled us to compare 
responses across different types of violent extremist groups. Future research should overcome 
this limitation. In addition, future research could also involve participants who might be at 
greatest risk of radicalization and engagement in violent extremism, although this might be 
challenging given the lack of an effective risk assessment tool in this domain (Monahan, 
2012). However, there are some factors such as ideology, affiliations, grievances, and moral 
emotions (Monahan, 2012) that may be used to ‘screen and select’ participants. Future 
research can also focus on those who have known to be (dis)engaged in violent extremism, 
although this may prove difficult as gatekeepers may prevent access to incarcerated 
populations (although such samples may be criticized for being unrepresentative of offending 
populations) and sampling from ‘sleeper cells’ is associated with safety, legal and ethical 
concerns.  
 
As stated at the outset, our research was inspired by a desire to provide a basis for 
testing a rational choice model of violent extremism. We acknowledge that there are other 
potentially useful theoretical approaches, and researchers could explore the value of applying 
those. For instance, recent research suggests that (de)radicalization may be understood in 
terms of an individual’s motivation to achieve personal significance, combined with 
an ideology stating violence is appropriate for pursuing this goal, and in the context of social 
networks reinforcing and enabling this (Kruglanski, Gelfand, Belanger, Sheveland, 
Hetiarachici, & Gunaratna, 2014).  
 
In a direct test of rational choice theory, other research suggests that the rational 
choice model may not be valid in predicting youths’ intentions to engage in criminal or other 
risky activities (e.g., Dhami & Mandel, 2012a; 2012b). Rather than carefully weighing up the 
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pros and cons of risky behaviors, youth may be solely motivated by the importance they 
attach to the perceived benefits, irrespective of their probabilities of occurrence and despite 
the perceived drawbacks. In fact, the impact of perceived drawbacks tends to be weaker than 
is implied by prevention strategies that focus on informing young people about the costs of 
risk taking (D’Amico & Fromme, 2002).  
 
While there is evidence to suggest that decisions in other domains are either not based 
on rational analyses of costs and benefits (e.g., Mazar & Arley, 2006), or that they are not 
based on conscious insights into a person’s own decision-making (e.g., Burroughs, Chaplin, 
Pandelaere, Norton, Ordabayeva, Gunz, & Dinauer, 2013), the number and richness of the 
insights provided by the present study’s participants indicates that empirical research 
investigating a model of rational choice for the decision to access, join and leave a violent 
extremist group may be warranted. The fact that the interpretation of costs and benefits might 
be affected by ideological contexts (e.g., death may be a reward under a Jihadi ideology but a 
drawback under another ideology) means that the value of rational choice approach may, 
however, be limited. To improve our understanding of violent extremism, developing and 
empirically testing models from both existing and new paradigms is essential.  
 
Models can also be extended to incorporate the findings of research suggesting that 
risk perceptions and risk taking may be influenced by non-cognitive factors. In the domain of 
violent extremism, these may include emotions such as anger or disgust (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2011; Pressman, 2009). It would be useful to identify the non-cognitive factors, 
such as emotions, that may impact individuals’ risk perceptions (i.e., importance and 
likelihood of the pros and cons). Hsee (1999) demonstrated that people make decisions about 
the future based on rational arguments but used emotions to make decisions about the 
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present. Thus, future research could also examine the effect of temporal context on 
individuals’ perceptions of the benefits and drawbacks of violent extremism. Finally, ‘sacred 
values’ or ‘moral rules’ may also affect or even override careful cost-benefit calculations 
(Ginges et al., 2011). Thus, future psychological research can ask: ‘How rational are violent 
extremists?’ and ‘What influences their rationality?’ These questions are not only of 
theoretical interest, but also of practical value since deterrence-based prevention strategies 
hinge on rational choice models of the offender (Clarke & Newman, 2009). 
 
In conclusion, current UK-based strategies for dealing with violent extremism include 
challenging ideology (HM Government, 2011), and identifying potentially vulnerable youth 
(such as those at University) and supporting them via counselling, faith guidance, civic 
engagement, working with their support networks, and providing education, employment, 
health and housing services (HM Government, 2010). These have been criticized for lacking 
an empirical or scientific evidence-base (Dhami, 2014). As Victoroff (2005) argues, even 
when policy-makers rely on the published research on the “mind of the terrorist”, “policies 
intended to reduce the risk of terrorism may be based on invalid premises” (p. 34). This is 
because past research has not been sufficiently hypothesis-based. The present study provides 
an insight into how male youth think about the pros and cons of (dis)engagement in violent 
extremism, and so can contribute to the sort of systematic theory testing research necessary 
for developing scientific evidence-based prevention and intervention strategies.   
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 It is outside the scope of the present paper to conduct a comprehensive review of the 
empirical research on terrorism and violent extremism, and so interested readers are referred 
to Victoroff (2005) and Monahan (2012) for reviews of the various other psychological 
theories and research. 
 
2
 It must be acknowledged that the rational choice approach has been challenged by scholars 
within the field of behavioral economics, among others. A full discussion of the proposed 
limitations beyond the scope and main aim of the present paper, and interested readers are 
directed to Hodgson (2012). 
 
3 
Another goal was to examine how feelings of anger might affect perceptions. Research 
shows that risk perceptions and risk taking may be affected by emotions (Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), and that 
negative emotions such as anger may be particularly useful in understanding thoughts about 
violent extremism or terrorism (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005). We used an 
adapted version of the Relived Anger Memory Task (RAM; Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen, 
& Ekman, 1991) to induce anger in a random half of the participants. The effectiveness of 
this anger induction task was tested using three items from the Positive and Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) that measure externally directed anger. An 
independent samples t-test revealed that the anger manipulation was unsuccessful. 
Independent samples t-tests also revealed no significant differences in the average number of 
benefits and drawbacks perceived by participants in the anger and control conditions, for any 
of the three violent extremist behaviors, ps > .05. In addition, chi-square analyses showed 
that Group (angry v. control) was not associated with the categories of benefits or drawbacks 
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perceived by participants for any of the three violent extremist behaviors, ps > .05. Therefore, 
we will not discuss this aspect of the study further in the present paper. 
 
4
 The reliability of responses might also be affected by the participant-researcher interaction. 
For instance, given the political, religious, racial and ideological motivations of violent 
extremists, participants may not wish to divulge information to researchers who are of a 
specific race, gender, nationality or apparent religion. Thus, online data collection can also 














Benefits Drawbacks  
M SD M SD SD of within-
subjects 
difference 
Accessing a violent extremist website
*
 2.1 1.8 2.9 1.7 1.7 
Joining a violent extremist group
*
 2.1 2.0 3.3 1.8 1.8 




p ≤ .001.  
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Accessing Joining Leaving  
Gain knowledge/awareness/insight/understanding 55.9 9.7  2.2 
Become part of a group/similar people 12.6 32.0  0.7 
Make a difference/be part of cause  1.8  4.9  0 
Increase positive emotions  2.7  4.9  8.9 








Deal with negative emotions  3.6  5.8  2.2 
Get opinions across  2.7  1.0  0 
Gather intelligence (evidence)   5.4  1.0  1.5 
Opportunity to commit crime/benefit from it  0.9  3.9  0 
Be supported/protected   0  7.8  0 
Prevent terrorism/crime 1.8  1.9  0 
Be safe/out of danger  0  1.0  8.9 
Reduce chances of being caught and punished by 







No longer be a terrorist/criminal/commit illegal acts  0  0 20.7 
















Other  11.7 9.7 16.3 
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Note. Columns may not sum to 100% due to rounding off. 
*The category “gain 
knowledge/awareness/insight/understanding” refers to participants wanting to gain general 
information. For instance, when referring to the benefit of accessing an extremist website one 
participant said “get more of a picture about what people who are terrorists think”. The 
category “gain intelligence/evidence” refers to participants wanting to obtain information 
pertaining to a specific terrorist plan of action. For example, when referring to the benefits of 
accessing an extremist website one participant said “knowing if and where a terrorist attack 
will be”. 
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Accessing Joining Leaving  
Get in trouble with CJS  5.5 16.1  1.7 
Be ostracized  2.4 10.6 10.0 
Be manipulated/influenced/pressured 9.8 12.2  0.8 
Be labelled/judged  6.7  10.6  8.3 
Be exposed to negative material 20.1  0.6  0 
Personal details associated with site/monitored  6.7  0  0 
Experience negative emotion 21.3  5.6  6.7 
expose self to danger/harm  0.6 10.0 16.7 
Experience reprisal/retaliation/dislike  0  0.6 24.2 
Be excluded/lose group and their support  0  0  8.3 
Harm to family  0  1.1  2.5 
Encourages violent/criminal beliefs/behavior 11.0 19.4  1.7 
Not be able to leave  0.6  1.1  6.7 
Other 15.2 12.2 12.5 
Note. Columns may not sum to 100% due to rounding off. 
 
